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Abstract Collective dilemmas have attracted widespread interest in several
social sciences and the humanities including economics, sociology and philos-
ophy. Since Hardin’s intuitive example of the Tragedy of the Commons, many
real-world public goods dilemmas have been analysed with a wide ranging set
of possible and actual solutions. The plethora of solutions to these dilemmas
suggests that people make different kinds of decision in different situations.
Rather than trying to find a unifying kind of reasoning to capture all situa-
tions, as the paradigm of rationality has done, this article develops a framework
of agent decision-making for social simulation, that takes seriously both differ-
ent kinds of decision making as well as different interpretations of situations.
The Contextual Action Framework for Computational Agents (CAFCA) al-
lows for the modelling of complex social phenomena, like dilemma situations,
with relatively simple agents by shifting complexity from an agent’s cognition
to an agent’s context.
Keywords Agent-based Modelling · Collective Dilemmas · Context · Action
Theory · Social Ontology
1 Introduction
Computational methods have seen increasing popularity in the social sciences
since the 1990s. The most essential feature of computational modelling in the
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social sciences is that simulation models allow for the representation and anal-
ysis of processes. Although society is widely recognised as dynamic, changing
and evolving, most social science methodologies do not do justice to these dy-
namics. A second essential feature of computational modelling is that it allows
for experimentation. Even though experimentation is in silico, in a virtual lab-
oratory, it allows for the exploration of interdependencies between parameters
over time in a controlled environment, engendering a deeper understanding of
processes underlying the dynamics of social phenomena.
A particularly fruitful computational method for the social sciences is
agent-based modelling (ABM). An agent-based model is a computer pro-
gramme consisting of autonomous, heterogeneous entities (called agents) that
interact with their environment and each other according to a set of individual
behaviour rules. Each agent perceives and evaluates its environment (including
other agents) and makes an autonomous decision about what to do next. The
unique features of ABM are the modelling of heterogeneity, context dependent
action and implementing qualitative behaviour rules.
One set of interesting social phenomena are collective dilemmas, such as
the Tragedy of the Commons. Although often discussed in rather abstract
terms, collective dilemmas exist in every shared kitchen, every community
project, or whereever people work together and there is a chance of free riding.
Collective dilemmas are of interest since in the real world they often seem to
resolve despite their dilemma structure. This is similar to the finding of high
cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma games in experiments with real people,
contrary to the predictions of game theory. Similar to the resolution of this
empirical incongruity, there is a plethora of approaches with which to analyse
collective dilemmas, such as invoking institutions (Ostrom (1990)), norms of
fairness (Eek and Biel (2003)), collective identity and group belonging (de Boer
(2008)) or collective reasoning (Gold and Sugden (2006)).
It seems that there is no one solution to collective dilemmas. Examin-
ing the array of solutions, together with existing ABM models of other so-
cial phenomena, we develop a framework in which agent decision-making is
made context dependent. Contextual Action Framework for Computational
Agents (CAFCA) allows for the transcendence of atomistic and individualistic
paradigms in modelling (by contexts providing structural feedback on decision
making) and addresses complex behaviours in the real world without compli-
cating the decision procedure of the agent (i.e. producing a black-box cognitive
architecture).
The paper is structured as follows: first we describe approaches to contex-
tual human and agent action, followed by a description of CAFCA after which
we address potential criticisms of CAFCA before finally drawing conclusions.
2 Behaviour, Action, Context
Although inspired by the conundrum of collective dilemmas, CAFCA is meant
as a much more general framework for the modelling of contextual action in
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ABM. We will briefly review some approaches to contextual human and agent
action to provide a theoretical backdrop for CAFCA.
2.1 Contextual Human Action
There is relatively little explicit esearch about context in sociology. Weber’s
Social Action Theory, distinguishing four motivations of actions resulting from
different kinds of reasoning, is a theoretical exception (Weber (1947)). Con-
text dependency is often implicit, hidden in qualitative methodologies (e.g.
grounded theory).
Environmental criminology approaches context by taking environmental
influences on criminal action into account. Situational Crime Prevention ex-
plores ways to amend the environment to make crime difficult and essentially
not worth committing but it is fully dependent on a rational choice reasoning
paradigm (Clarke (1997)). A development towards a contextual action frame-
work is Wikstro¨m’s Situational Action Theory (Wikstro¨m (2010)). Situational
Action Theory is a theory of criminal behaviour that bridges the dichotomy
of criminological research into pathological and situational crime and investi-
gates the interaction between individual characteristics, such as self-control,
and situational variables, such as deterrence.1
A Kantian reasoning framework distinguishes between reasoning informed
by our desires, interests and aims, i.e. strategic reasoning, and reasoning in-
formed by duty and obligations, i.e. normative, deontic, moral reasoning, which
can be interpreted as a contextualisation framework, cf. Rawls (1971), Raz
(2005).
Economics has spent relatively little time on contextuality, emphasising
instead the universality of rationality. Nonetheless, normative considerations
have been incorporated into some instrumental reasoning approaches, partly
due to the empirical evidence that people do not reason as utility maximisers.
Pure utility maximisation is amended to utility maximisation relative to a set
of preferences. Normative considerations are then transported into the set of
preferences, e.g. altruism (Rabin (1993)). This is known as the transformation
of preferences (e.g. Guala (2006)). The transformation approach ontologically
reduces normative to instrumental reasoning; however, behaviourally the dis-
tinction can be retained. An amendment of preferences informing action in
collective dilemmas can also be seen as a social context, i.e. considerations
of group belonging or membership (de Boer (2008)) provide a social con-
text for decision making, as does team reasoning in both its developments
by Bacharach (Gold and Sugden (2006)) and Sugden (Sugden (1993), Sugden
(2003)). The first is a normative context, where invoking institutions (Ostrom
(1990)) or evolved norms of fairness (Eek and Biel (2003)) are preference con-
straints constituting a context for decision making.
1 An agent-based model inspired by Situational Action Theory can be found in (Elsen-
broich, 2014, Chapter 11).
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2.2 Contextual Computational Agent Action
In an agent-based model each agent makes a decision after perceiving its par-
ticular environment, both social and physical. In most models context collapses
into a social or physical environment with a single kind of reasoning applied to
it. This kind of modelling has often been accused of being reductivist on two
accounts, being individualist and behaviouralist. In order to make agent deci-
sion making more realistic, more and more elaborate agent architectures have
been developed.2 Cognitive architectures have the regrettable side-effect that
they make models much harder to analyse and thus impede the understanding
of the target system that is being modelled. In contrast, context dependent de-
cision making is a relatively small field in ABM. We discuss three approaches
which take the relationship between context and decision making more seri-
ously.
One model is the CONSUMAT, a generic framework to simulate human
behaviour in consumer decision situations. In its first version (Jager (2000)),
it was a four cell model encompassing repetition, deliberation, imitation, and
social comparison. The choice of the decision making mode is mapped onto
an agent’s needs and uncertainty concerning the results of behaviour. High
levels of satisfaction and certainty lead to repetition, low certainty and high
satisfaction result in imitation, high certainty and low satisfaction lead to
deliberation and low certainty and low satisfaction cause social comparison.
A recent version of the CONSUMAT model (Jager and Janssen (2012)) also
includes satisficing and uses social networks to inform the social comparison
mode.
A second context sensitive agent-based model is Verhagen’s Norm Learning
model (Verhagen (2001)). Here, agents learn how to behave in an environment
and also learn group norms for behaviour in that environment. In a decision
situation, the agent tries to make the optimal choice. The result of the be-
haviour choice is used to update the agent’s own evaluation model. At the
same time, it announces its situation to all agents in its group. The group
members reply with their evaluation function for that situation. Using this
feedback, the agent builds a second evaluation function, an internal represen-
tation of the groups evaluation function which in this model is called the norm.
In different simulation studies the effect of leadership (by varying the weight of
the evaluation of the leader versus that of the rest of the group) and autonomy
(varying the weight an agent attaches to its own evaluation function versus its
perceived group norm) were studied. The driving force to choose the one or
the other is the conformity tendency of the agent.
A third context conscious agent specification is the Emil-A agent archi-
tecture and Emil-S simulation platform (Conte et al (2013)). Here agents can
distinguish factual and normative contexts, apply different kinds of reasoning
and choose actions accordingly. Emil-A is a first systematic implementation
of normative dynamics, such as norm internalisation, into an agent architec-
2 For a recent review of architectures and what they do, see Balke and Gilbert (2014).
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ture. Emil-S has been applied in several application areas, such as traffic rules
(Lotzmann (2010), micro-finance (Lucas et al (2010)) and extortion racketeer-
ing (Nardin et al (under review), Troitzsch (2015)).
From the discussion of the above approaches we can see that some work
has been done to advance contextual aspects of agent-based modelling but
that it has focussed largely on normative reasoning. The CONSUMAT is a
contextual framework that models consumer decisions very well. However, not
all human decisions are, or can be framed as consumer choice. The framework
in the next section extends from the specific case of consumption to capture
all decision making.
3 Introducing CAFCA
When modelling social phenomena it is important to model those aspects of
human decision making relevant for the phenomenon at the level of specificity
relevant for the purpose of the model. This means that behaviours have to
be generalisable across agents, whilst particular for an individual in a spe-
cific situation or context. To preserve the particularity of individual decision
making we suggest a framework based on the idea that decisions are highly
contextual, i.e. dependent on an agent’s interpretation of a situation. In order
to also ensure the needed generality, CAFCA is a two dimensional framework
of contexts, as depicted in Figure 1.
Each dimension has three elements: the social dimension constituted by
the individual, social and collective and the reasoning dimension consisting
of automatic, strategic and normative reasoning. Thus, the framework distin-
guishes nine contexts. In the individual mode the agent interprets the decision
as independent of others. In the social mode agents recognise other agents in
the situation but see themselves as distinct from or in competition with them.
In the collective mode the agent not only recognises others but perceives itself
as belonging to the others, as a member of a collective or team.
There is no need to argue for the existence of atomistic and social contexts
as it has been widely accepted. The difference for decision making is that in the
former outcomes are absolute whereas in the latter they are interdependent
with the decisions of others. The addition of the collective context, however,
needs some closer attention. Similar to the social context, outcomes are rela-
tive to the decisions of others. What distinguishes it from the social context,
however, is the transformation of agency, from the individual to the collective
or team (Hakli et al (2010)). This means that the other is not seen as an in-
cumbent on the decision making but as a positive force for achieving a joint
endeavour. Due to space restrictions we cannot here argue in detail for the
ontological uniqueness of collective contexts but refer to extensive literature
that supports its inclusion into our framework (see Elsenbroich (2014) for a
review article).
Automatic action is non-reasoned action, a behavioural reaction to a stimu-
lus. An individual automatic reaction is to simply repeat previous actions (e.g.
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Fig. 1 The Contextual Action Framework.
stopping at red lights). In a social situation an automatic reaction is to per-
ceive and imitate the actions of other agents (e.g. looking left-right-left when
crossing the road). Imitation has been used extensively in agent-based mod-
elling particularly for coordination phenomena (e.g. pedestrian modelling). A
collective automatic reaction is also to perceive the actions of other agents,
but rather than simply imitating their behaviours, an agent will understand
others’ intentions and participate in the activity (e.g. helping an old lady cross
the road).
Strategic reasoning is goal-directed reasoning where the goal is utility max-
imisation. The social dimension in strategic reasoning determines who is taken
into account in the decision making. In the individual case this means assessing
a situation in light of ones preferences and choosing the action that produces
the optimal outcome, (e.g. consumer decisions). In the social case the payoffs
of different agents are interdependent. This is the social extension of rational
choice captured in game theory and related approaches. In the collective case
an individual applies the strategic considerations not to its own utility but to
the utility of a group, team or collective. It is based on team-reasoning, an
extension to game theory discussed in Section 2.1.
Normative reasoning is rule following rather than goal directed. The social
aspects determine the origin of the rules. In the individual case the rules are
seen as given, like a set of laws, obligations or rights. An agent needs to be
able to recognise the correct rule for the situation and resolve conflict in case
of inconsistent rules. In the social case the rules are generated by the agent
observing the behaviour of other agents. By generalising observed behaviour
individuals extrapolate a social norm of how to behave. In the collective case
rules are extrapolated by taking the collective into account. A rule from this
origin needs group wide or universal applicability, like moral principles such
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as Utilitarianism or Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
The main difference between CAFCA and traditional environmental decision-
making frameworks is that in CAFCA it is not just the action that is triggered
by the situation but the kind of reasoning that leads to an action. For exam-
ple, if an agent interprets a situation as normative and perceives the actions of
others it will extrapolate a norm for behaviour that it will follow, whereas if it
perceives the same situation as strategic it will try to outsmart other agents.
Different agents can perceive the same situation differently, (re)acting differ-
ently. A detailed discussion of how agents perceive different contexts and how
they might move from one context to another depends on factors that lie out-
side this discussion of CAFCA. Nonetheless, we will discuss some of the ideas
surrounding this issue briefly in Section 4, where we also address criticisms of
CAFCA.
3.1 Applications of CAFCA
CAFCA is first and foremost intended to support agent-based modelling and
in this spirit we briefly discuss some practical applications.
1. CAFCA helps to conceptualise model specifications.
In designing a model, the kinds of reasoning an agent might potentially
employ and the social situations it might find itself in, need to be speci-
fied. Looking at the CONSUMAT, the agent moves between individual and
social modes and automatic and deliberative modes (Jager and Janssen
(2012)). A model does not have to take into account all contexts; different
target systems comprise different sets of contexts. CAFCA helps to concep-
tualise a target system and thus helps in operationalising agent behaviour
for the model.
2. CAFCA supports modelling of genuine sociality.
ABM have often been seen as presupposing individualism or atomism (Ep-
stein (2011)). By stripping individual agents of unnecessary complexity,
enhancing the role of context and giving the context a social dimension,
CAFCA opens up an ontology for modelling that goes beyond atomism.
Furthermore, CAFCA provides a framework that takes both agency and
structure seriously, thus bridging an age old dichotomy in the social sci-
ences.
3. CAFCA takes away the need for complicated black-box cognitive
agents.
CAFCA allows for the modelling of complex phenomena without increasing
the complexity of the agents. The strategy is to shift complexity into the
context rather than an agent’s cognitive machine. Environmentally situ-
ated behaviour is a hallmark of agent-based modelling. CAFCA transforms
a simple environmental reaction into a contextual action by considering the
agent’s perception of the social aspects of the situation as well as what kind
of reasoning is appropriate in this situation. By generalising over a set of
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contexts, CAFCA reduces the complexity of agents, thus combining con-
text specificity with generalisability. Complex cognitive agent architectures
can be accommodated in our framework but it is not necessary to have a
complex architecture in the first place.
3.2 (A Part of) CAFCA in Action
CAFCA is a framework describing 9 different modes of decision making for
actions in an agent-based model. Although the nine modes are assembled into
a three-by-three framework here, it is not the intention of CAFCA that a
model should implement all those modes. On the contrary, the framework’s
purpose is to assist a modeller in thinking about the target system, identifying
which modes might be at work and experimenting with them in the model.
The example we want to discuss is that of extortion racketeering by the Italian
Mafia in Sicily.
Extortion racketeering has been explored mainly as a strategic interac-
tion between extorters and victims, formalised in game theory (e.g. Smith and
Varese (2001)). Elsenbroich and Badham (under review) discuss the impor-
tance of taking the social context into account in the analysis of extortion
rackets. Using an ABM allowed for modelling the fact that very few punish-
ments are necessary to control a large territory and showing how fakers could
survive in the shadow of real Mafiosi. The strategic interaction of the extorter
and victim relies largely on deterrence. In game theory the possibility of pun-
ishment becomes an endogenous part of the utility function. In the ABM this
probability is exogenised and becomes a function of the punishments observed
in the neighbourhood. This is an implementation of a strategic-social mode of
decision making into an ABM.
Elsenbroich (under review) extends the model to investigate the phenomenon
of the rise of the Addio Pizzo movement and resulting increases in resistance
against the Mafia. The model tests three hypotheses regarding how resistance
might be harnessed by an organisation like Addio Pizzo. The first hypothesis is
based on strategic social interaction, similar to the model discussed in Elsen-
broich and Badham (under review) but with an added player: the consumer.
Addio Pizzo emphasises the critical consumer aspects of their campaign, giving
members stickers for the doors to show the consumer which shops are pizzo
free. The implementation means that increasing levels of critical consumers
lower the payoff an entrepreneur has from paying the pizzo. The second is
based on a change of reasoning from strategic to normative. The conundrum
in southern Italy and Sicily regarding extortion racketeering is that paying the
pizzo seems to have become a social norm, transcending the simple deterrence
effect and creating a positive feedback loop from neighbours paying the pizzo
rather than just from seeing them being punished. Consumer pressure and
normative changes are also considered in Troitzsch (2015) and Nardin et al
(under review), each implementing two boxes from CAFCA, the strategic-
social and the normative-social. In Elsenbroich (under review) two additional
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decision-making modes are added to the model: the strategic-collective and
the normative-collective modes from the right most column in CAFCA. The
rationale is that Addio Pizzo create a collective, a team, and agents start
maximising not their individual but the collective’s utility.
The operationalisations of the different kinds of reasoning produce the
different contexts of relevant neighbourhood features an agent takes into ac-
count whan making a decision. In this particular implementation, consumer
decisions are a simple numerical amendment to the agent’s utility function.3
Normative aspects make the agent take the behaviour of their surrounding
agents into account. Whereas before only the punishment of other agents pro-
vided information for agents, adding a normative dimension to the decision
making means taht agents take into account the number of resistant and com-
pliant entrepreneurs in their neighbourhood and amend their utility function
accordingly. Collective aspects mean agents apply the consideration to the
group rather than the individual, so the size of the group they consider to be
part of provides the relevant change. Strategic, normative and collective modes
of reasoning show different patterns in reducing resistance. Consumer pressure
leads to excessive losses on the side of the entrepreneur, and even though finan-
cially it becomes much less viable to pay the protection money, resistance is
short lived with the fear of punishment taking over. The normative-social case
leads to higher fluctuations between resistance and acquiescence but does not
lead to sustainable levels of resistance. Similarly, the strategic-collective case
does not yield sustainable resistance although initial resistance is strong. For
small group radii collective reasoning brings about high fluctuation in resis-
tance levels whilst for larger groups resistance is almost nonexistentl. However,
the normative-collective case has a clear tipping point where small groups do
not lead to any change in resistance and large groups lead to almost complete
resistance.
The purpose of this model is to look at the influences of the different
interactions with the environment regarding macro outcomes, such as levels of
resistance, and CAFCA helps to conceptualise the different kinds of reasoning
that might play a part in decision making as well as their interplay.
The purpose of this model is to look at the influences of the different inter-
actions with the environment on macro outcomes such as levels or resistance
and CAFCA helps to conceptualise the different kinds of reasoning that might
play a part in decision making as well as their interplay.
4 Addressing Criticisms of CAFCA
So far we have discussed benefits of CAFCA, which uses a relatively broad
ontology. Producing a broad ontology opens one up up for criticisms, some of
which we want to address in this section.
3 But in Troitzsch (2015) consumers are agents in the model, exogenising their influence.
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So far we have discussed benefits of CAFCA, which uses a relatively broad
ontology. Producing a broad ontology opens oneself up for criticisms, some of
which we want to address in this section.
1. As ABM are simply stochastic simulations, the differentiation be-
tween different modes of reasoning boils down to different prob-
ability distributions.
Although probabilities play a role in the specifications of ABM, stochastic
simulations and ABM have to be distinguished.4 In stochastic individual
based simulations the dynamics of the model are defined by transition
probabilities from one state to the next, e.g. micro-simulation models or
stochastic actor-based models for network dynamics (Snijders et al (2010)).
In agent-based models the dynamics are a result of interactions between
agents and agents and the environment. In the example model discussed in
Section 3.2 the different kinds of reasonings are not different probabilities
assigned to action possibilities. They are different interactions with the
environment, or context, informing the utility function in different ways.
For example the strategic modes of reasoning extract information from
the environment to judge the probability of punishment whilst normative
modes take in the levels of resistance in order to extrapolate what norm
the other agents follow and accordingly adapt to this norm.
2. The distinctions that CAFCA makes are non-existent. Normative
preferences can go into strategic considerations, and internalised
norms can lead to automatic behaviour.
Whilst it is certainly the case that norms can lead to automatic behaviours
(internalisation), as well inform the preferences of strategic decision making
(e.g. altruism), this is not a rebuke of CAFCA’s central ontological com-
mitment to the separability of nine modes of reasoning. In order for norms
to be internalised, normative reasoning has to have previously occurred; in
order for norms to inform preferences for strategic decision making, nor-
mative reasoning has to have already taken place. This is not about a lack
of variation in the kinds of reasoning but about the possibility of transition
between one and the other.
Whilst it is certainly the case that norms can lead to automatic behaviours
(internalisation) as well informing the preferences of strategic decision mak-
ing (e.g. altruism), this is not a rebuke of CAFCA’s central ontological com-
mitment to the separability of nine modes of reasoning. In order for norms
to be internalised, normative reasoning has to have taken place previously;
in order for norms to inform preferences for strategic decision making, nor-
mative reasoning has to have taken place previously. This is not about the
kinds of reasoning not being different but about the possibility of transition
between one and the other.
3. CAFCA determines to provide a full social ontology of contexts
but does not discuss how agents recognise or select contexts.
4 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this potential confusion.
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CAFCA does not contain any information about how contexts are recog-
nised or selected. This is deliberate rather than an omission as we think
that these questions can only be answered domain specifically.
CAFCA does not contain any information about how contexts are recog-
nised or selected. This is deliberate rather than an omission as we think
that these questions can only be answered domain specifically.
Above we discussed, the CONSUMAT is one of the first implementations
of different contexts into an agent-based model. Agents are satisficers and
decision heuristics are mapped along the dimensions of uncertainty and
cognitive effort. If an agent is satisfied where it is it can simply repeat its
past actions, thus not spend any cognitive effort. If dissatisfied it either has
to start deliberating, i.e. apply strategic choice, or observe other agents,
i.e. imitate or engage in social comparison, depending on its level of uncer-
tainty, neither can the criteria of cognitive effort and uncertainty be applied
to the contexts in CAFCA nor are the four contexts of the CONSUMAT
necessarily captured by the two criteria.
Although the transition between automatic and strategic deliberation can
result from considerations about cognitive effort, it is difficult to evalu-
ate whether strategic or normative considerations are more cognitively
demanding. The switch from what can be done to what should be done
might even depend on which social context an agents perceives itself to be
in. For example, in an individual context strategic considerations might be
prevalent, whereas understanding a situation as social or collective might
trigger normative interpretations
Although the transition between automatic and strategic deliberation can
result from considerations about cognitive effort, it is difficult to evalu-
ate whether strategic or normative considerations are more cognitively de-
manding. The switch from what can be done to what should be done might
even depend on which social context an agents perceives itself to be in. For
example in an individual context strategic considerations might be preva-
lent whereas understanding a situation as social or collective might trigger
normative interpretations.
Finally, in the four contexts of the CONSUMAT, which in our model re-
late to the individual and social automatic and strategic, the reason for an
agent to choose one or another might not be captured by the dimensions
of uncertainty and cognitive effort. A situation might be recognised as an
individually automatic context due to an internalised norm. The motiva-
tion is then not satisficing together with minimising cognitive effort but a
triggering of the internalised norm.
In addition to contextualised agent decision making, we thus also strongly
argue for domain specific applications of the framework. Each target sys-
tem, e.g. consumer choice, preventive health adoption, extortion rackets or
sustainability practices, will need to be analysed individually to see which
contexts are relevant and what motivates humans to switch contexts. There
is, however, one existing research approach to context we are very sympa-
thetic towards. Edmonds develops contextual social behaviour in such a
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way that decision-making is made dependent on the recognition of the
context and context recognition is made dependent on context learning
(cf. Edmonds (2013) and Edmonds (2014)).
4. How does CAFCA compare to existing models? Does it make
them more accurate? And can it replicate outcomes from existing
models?
In some ways CAFCA is not something new. There is a plethora of mod-
els in existence using a variety of reasoning rules to implement agent be-
haviours. Some are based on simple reactive behaviours to the environment,
while others are an implementation of game theoretic principles, and yet
others use psychological theories as a foundation. There are, however, two
aspects of CAFCA that are new. The first one is that it adds collective
reasoning to the modelling repertoire. Collective reasoning has become a
major concern in social ontology (Hakli et al (2010)) as well as Game
Theory (Bacharach (1999), Gold and Sugden (2006)) but has to date not
found its way into modelling. The second aspect is that CAFCA gathers
and formalises disparate kinds of reasoning commonly used in modelling.
This unification into one framework will help the conceptualisation of the
target system and simplify operationalisation. Hence CAFCA is not in
competition with, nor does it replicate or change existing models. It helps
to conceptualise decisions made in existing models and allows for a compar-
ison of different models of the same target system. For example, an ABM
on the spread of an epidemic might take into account agent behaviour
at different levels of abstraction, such as simple airborne contagion in a
population Hatchett et al (2007),risk calculations and network connections
Epstein et al (2008) or much more complex beliefs about vaccinations and
other preventive behaviours (e.g. Badham and Gilbert (2015) taking into
account personal beliefs and social norms). The modelling decisions re-
garding which aspects to model and which to leave out are informed by
the research question, and depending on this it will be relevant to model
decision making at different levels of abstraction and take different contex-
tual aspects into account. CAFCA is there to assist these decisions.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
In this article we have presented the Contextual Action Framework for Com-
putational Agents (CAFCA), a two-dimensional framework to conceptualise
the actions of human and artificial agents. Rather than focussing on complex
architectures to capture the complexity of human decision making, CAFCA
defines contexts, which give rise to certain behaviours. The contexts are defined
by two dimensions, one being a social aspect, the other a reasoning aspect. It
thus lifts environmentally stimulant responses to agents interpreting contexts
within which they (re)act.
he purpose of CAFCA is first and foremost to provide a framework to op-
erationalise context dependent human action for modelling social phenomena.
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Although intuitively human action is deeply contextual, social science either
neglects context in favour of generalisability in statistical research or forsakes
generalisability for context in qualitative approaches. CAFCA bridges these
extremes by linking action to context whilst framing contexts at a generalis-
able level.
CAFCA allows for keeping the agent architecture relatively simple, avoid-
ing black-box, untracktable simulation models without denying models the
necessary complexity to do justice to social phenomena. It transcends atomistic
paradigms often found in agent-based modelling by linking agent behaviours
to the recognition of social contexts, including membership of collectives. It
combines individualist and structuralist approaches in the social sciences by
embedding individual decision making with the social, normative and collec-
tive aspects of decision making. Finally, it allows for the coexistence of dif-
ferent kinds of reasoning and explicates which behaviours they might lead to,
depending on the social context.
The purpose of CAFCA is first and foremost to provide a framework to op-
erationalise context dependent human action for modelling social phenomena.
Although intuitively human action is deeply contextual, social science either
neglects context in favour of generalisability in statistical research or forsakes
generalisability for context in qualitative approaches. CAFCA bridges these
extremes by linking action to context whilst framing contexts at a generalis-
able level.
CAFCA allows to keep the agent architecture relatively simple, avoiding
black-box, untracktable simulation models without denying models the nec-
essary complexity to do justice to social phenomena. It transcends atomistic
paradigms often found in agent-based modelling by linking agent behaviours
to the recognition of social contexts, including membership of collectives. It
combines individualist and structuralist approaches in the social sciences by
embedding individual decision making with social, normative and collective
aspects of decision making. Finally, it allows the coexistance of different kinds
of reasoning and explicates which behaviours they might lead to, depending
on the social context.
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